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Abstract 
 Under the influence of Enlightenment epistemological 
thought, the social sciences have exhibited a distinct 
tendency to prefer deterministic explanations of social 
phenomena.  In so doing, social scientists of the 
‘foundational’ school have sought objective knowledge of 
social phenomena by eliminating the subjective intrusions 
of concerned actors (Hekman, 1986)1. However, as 
Bruner (1990; p. 118) points out “…there are no causes 
to be grasped with certainty where the act of meaning is 
concerned.” It is clear that ‘foundationalist’ views of 
knowledge have come to dominate the information 
systems (IS) field in that they influence extant 
perspectives on knowledge management and on the 
posited role of IT in creating, capturing, and diffusing 
knowledge in social and organisational contexts. In order 
to address what many would consider to be a deficiency 
in such thinking, this paper offers an ‘antifoundationalist’ 
perspective that considers knowledge as being 
simultaneously ‘situated’ and ‘distributed’ and which 
recognizes its role shaping social action within ‘contexts 
of practice’. Insights drawn from this short essay are 
addressed to academics and practitioners in the IS field in 
order to illustrate the considerable difficulties inherent in 
representing individual knowledge and of the viability of 
isolating, capturing and managing knowledge in 
organisational contexts.  
What Knowledge is and What it is Not  
 The point of departure for the present treatise on the 
concept of ‘knowledge’ is a definition that is in good 
standing within the IS field and which is congruent with 
extant perspectives across the social sciences (see Grant, 
1996, for example). In their book Working Knowledge, 
Davenport and Prusak (1998; p.3) posit that: 
Knowledge is a fluid mix of framed experience, 
values, contextual information, and expert insight that 
provides a framework for evaluating and incorporating 
new experiences and information. It originates and is 
applied in the minds of knowers. In organisations, it 
often becomes embedded not only in documents and 
repositories but also in organisational routines, 
processes, practices and norms.    
 
 While this definition is, on the surface, all-embracing 
and without contradiction is does, however, possess 
certain weaknesses that can only be illustrated by a 
consideration of taken-for-granted issues of ontology. The 
core issue here revolves around describing the 
relationships that exist between the individual and his 
social world, between the knowing social actor and social 
groupings and contexts in which he or she participates. In 
terms of the present essay, this task begins with a brief 
consideration of the constructivist, ‘antifoundational’ 
philosophies of Martin Heidegger and Hans Georg 
Gadamer in order to sketch out the ontological basis of 
knowledge.  
An Ontological Perspective on Knowledge 
 In response to the question ‘What is knowledge and 
What is it not? we argue that knowledge cannot ever 
become “embedded … in documents and repositories 
[and] also in organisational routines, processes, 
practices and norms.” Why? Precisely because it is 
impossible to isolate and represent objectively “a fluid 
mix of framed experience, values, contextual information, 
and expert insight.” Certainly, as Bruner (1990) points 
out, a person’s knowledge resides not only in his head, 
but also in the notes, underlined book passages, manuals 
and guides he consults, and in the computer-based data he 
has access to. It is clear, however, that these are sources 
of personal information only for the actor who has 
painstakingly sought out, collated, and put into context 
the data contained in each personal artifact. Contextual, 
temporally based data makes the transition to knowledge 
only when an actor interprets it in order to inform his or 
her understanding of some phenomenon or other.  All this 
is indicative of the ‘situated’ and ‘distributed’ nature of 
knowledge: But how does it relate to the social context 
and ground of knowledge?  
 As part of the interpretive process that characterizes 
all understanding, meaning is attributed to data within the 
context of the actor’s constantly evolving ‘lived 
experience’ and under the sway of a ‘tradition’ (Gadamer, 
1975). Gadamer (1975) and Heidegger (1976) illustrate 
that the ‘lived experience’ of social actors arises out of the 
web of encounters and dialogues that characterize 
individual existence or ‘Being-in-the-world’. The concept 
of ‘lived experience’ describes the relationship between 
social actors and other beings that populate the tradition 
or culture in which they are embedded (in a Heideggerian 
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 sense, the term being refers not only to other humans but 
all social phenomena). In delineating the constitution of 
‘lived experience’, Heidegger (1976) points out social 
actors are ‘thrown’ in to a ‘life-world’ where their 
existence has, from the outset, been ‘tuned’ or ‘situated’ 
to be a specific existence with other beings, within a 
specific tradition, and with a specific history. However, in 
order to cope with their ‘throwness’ social actors come 
ready equipped with a ‘foreknowledge’ or, in Gadamerian 
terms, a ‘prejudice’-laden ‘effective-historical 
consciousness’, that enables them to interpret, make sense 
of and partake in their social world. ‘Foreknowledge’ is, 
in many ways, knowledge of the ‘ready-to-hand’ 
(Zuhanden) that constitute an actor’s ‘life world’. Thus, 
the ‘ready-to-hand’ possess a degree of familiarity that 
effectively sees them dissolved into the unreflective 
background of the actor’s daily existence. If, however, 
something happens that results in a ‘breakdown’ in 
understanding, social phenomena become the object of 
‘theoretical’ reasoning and acquire the ontological status 
of being ‘present-at-hand’ (i.e. a Vorhanden) until the 
‘breakdown’ has been repaired.  As Gadamer illustrates, 
social actors must give recognition to the influence that 
‘effective-historical consciousness’ exerts if they are to 
work out their ‘prejudices’. The process of ‘working out’ 
prejudices and of repairing ‘breakdowns’ in 
understanding is governed by what Gadamer called the 
hermeneutic ‘circle of understanding’. Here, the ‘whole’ 
that constitutes a phenomenon is apprehended by the 
cyclical interpretation of its constituent ‘parts’ as they 
relate to each other and to the ‘whole.’ In so doing, an 
actor interprets relevant data as ‘present-at-hand’ using a 
form of question and answer called the dialectic (Socratic, 
Hegelian and Analytic-Reductionist—see Butler, 1998). 
Thus, the actors’ understanding of constituent ‘parts’ will 
be consolidated, and in so doing the horizons or 
perspectives of interpreter and interpreted will gradually 
fuse. Thus, in repairing ‘breakdowns’ a ‘fusion of 
horizons’ (of understanding) takes place between 
interpreter and interpreted.  The pivotal role of language 
in the interpretive process of understanding is has been 
noted by Gadamer (1975). Accordingly, Bruner (1990) 
argues that institutional contexts are socially constructed 
through the narratives of constituent actors. Thus, over 
time and through highly complex and ill-defined social 
processes constituted by a polyphonic dialectic evolves 
the shared understanding that constitutes culture and 
tradition. Finally, it is clear from Gadamer (1975) that the 
authoritative impulse to conform, as indicated by the 
existence of Heidegger’s das Man, is testimony to the 
resilience of a shared ‘world view’ among actors in 
institutional contexts. This brief ontological view of 
knowledge has profound implications for those who 
examine the nature of knowledge and its diffusion in 
institutional contexts as will be seen in the following sub-
section.  
IT and the Social Construction of Knowledge 
 If the key to understanding social action lies in 
explicating the influence of shared ‘weltanschauungen’, 
‘lived experience’, and ‘tradition’, as socially embedded 
institutional knowledge, then the representation of such 
knowledge must be the goal of all who propose to manage 
it. However, the impossibility of this task is underlined by 
Dreyfus (1998) who cites Husserl’s exasperation at trying 
to give a detailed account of the experience of the 
everyday lives of social actors. Husserl (1960) termed 
social actors’ representations of their experiential 
knowledge the noema. However, after devoting his life’s 
work to its delineation he concluded in the face of the 
noema’s “huge concreteness” that the “tremendous 
complication” in its representation made it an impossible 
task (Husserl, 1969; p. 244 and p. 246). Significantly, 
Minsky (1981) commented on the enormity of attempting 
to represent common-sense experiential knowledge using 
computer-based systems. This point is underscored by 
Bruner (1990; p.5) who argues that: 
Information processing cannot deal with anything 
beyond well-defined and arbitrary entries that can 
enter into specific relationships that are strictly 
governed by a program of elementary operations. 
 Thus, in Bruner’s Acts of Meaning the message is 
clear: the experiential knowledge and skills of social 
actors cannot readily, if ever, be embedded in information 
systems (see Boland, 1987). However this is not 
surprising as Dreyfus (1998) notes that philosophers from 
Socrates to Husserl have wrestled with the problem of 
knowledge representation without much success. 
Nevertheless, additional arguments are adduced to 
convince the skeptical. 
 The socially constructed nature of knowledge is 
indicated by Berger and Luckmann (1967: p. 65) who 
posit that: 
The primary knowledge about institutional order is 
knowledge on the pretheoretical level. It is the sum 
total of 'what everyone knows' about a social world, 
an assemblage of maxims, morals, proverbial nuggets 
of wisdom, values and beliefs, myths and so forth, the 
theoretical integration of which requires considerable 
intellectual fortitude in itself, as the long line of heroic 
integrators from Homer to the latest sociological 
system-builders testify.  
This point is indicative of the nature of organisational 
reality; it is also congruent with the perspectives of 
Heidegger and Gadamer as articulated previously. Hence, 
pretheoretical knowledge, as the articulated (present-at-
hand) and unarticulated (ready-to-hand) components of 
Aristotelian ‘phronesis’ (experiential ‘self-knowledge’) 
and ‘techne’ (‘skills-based’ knowledge), plays a formative 
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 role in establishing canonical modes of behavior 
(habitualised social action or organisational routines, if 
you will) and in the transmission of social behaviors 
among actor networks (Gadamer, 1975; Dunne, 1993). To 
underscore this, Dreyfus (1998; p. 285) turns to 
Heidegger to argue that “the everyday context which 
forms the background of communications is not a belief 
system or a set of rules or principles…but is rather a set 
of social skills, a kind of know-how, any aspect of which 
makes sense only on the rest of the shared social 
background.” What then of the IS researchers and 
practitioners who assume that it is possible to describe 
and codify social contexts as objective facts and who 
therefore consider unproblematic the transfer of 
knowledge in organisations? Dreyfus (ibid., p. 283) again 
draws on Heidegger to reject the notion that “the shared 
world presupposed in communication could be 
represented as an explicit and formalized set of facts.” 
All this implies that social knowledge cannot be 
objectified and exist outside the ‘heads’ of knowers: 
furthermore, it renders fruitless any attempt to codify it 
objectively. It also casts doubt on those who speak 
authoritatively about knowledge transfer mechanisms and 
who ignore the social contexts that gives rise to such 
knowledge.   
Aristotle and Individual Knowledge 
 In Book 6 of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle focuses 
on practical and technical reason—phronesis and techne. 
The importance and relevance of this work to any 
treatment of knowledge is underscored by Dunne (1993). 
Hence, an understanding of phronesis and techne is 
essential to the present project as it brings into sharp focus 
the situated nature of individual knowledge and, as 
Gadamer (1975) illustrates, adds to the ontological 
description already offered. To begin, it must be noted 
that in reading the Ethics in the context of the 
Metaphysics one is led to conclude that both phronesis 
and techne are, ultimately, forms of practical knowledge. 
However, in the Ethics Aristotle distinguishes between 
praxis and poiesis. The conduct of social affairs in a 
thoughtful and competent manner Aristotle refers to as 
praxis. This involves the application of phronesis, that is, 
a social actor’s experientially based ‘self-knowledge’. 
Poiesis, on the other hand, Aristotle involves the activities 
of ‘making’ or ‘production’. Here techne is the kind of 
knowledge possessed by the expert craftsmen and 
involves the understanding and application of the 
principles governing the production of social 
phenomena—both tangible and intangible. It is important 
to note that Dunne (1993) in his extensive treatment of the 
topic interprets phronesis as being practical knowledge 
and techne as being skills-based knowledge. However, on 
page 244 he states, in regard to poiesis and praxis, that 
“To these two specifically different modes of activity, 
techne and phronesis correspond, respectively, as two 
rational powers which give us two quite distinct modes of 
practical knowledge.” Thus, a social actor’s ‘self-
knowledge’ (phronesis) is a synthesis of his temporal 
experience of social phenomena with an ability to perform 
practical actions in relation to such phenomena. 
According to Gadamer’s (1975) interpretation of 
Aristotle’s phronesis, experiential or ‘self-knowledge’ 
cannot be learned or forgotten; it is ethical and moral in 
character and, as such, it is the supreme influence on an 
individual’s actions. It is clear that skill-based knowledge 
(techne) and theoretical knowledge (as theoria, sophia, or 
episteme) are informed by the ‘self-knowledge’ 
(phronesis) of relevant social actors. In so doing, ‘self-
knowledge’ embraces, as Gadamer indicates, both the 
means and ends of social action. Because of its unique 
constitution, ‘self-knowledge’ does not often lend itself to 
linguistic expression. The same could be said of ‘techne’, 
which provides the expert or craftsman with an 
understanding of the why and the wherefore, the how and 
with-what of the production process. Thus, techne, in 
providing a rational plan of action, also embraces both the 
means and ends of production activities. 
Implications of Phronesis and Techne for the 
IS Field 
 This essay argues that an understanding of phronesis 
and techne as the two primordial components of 
individual knowledge is vital for researchers and 
practitioners in the IS field. Yet studies on systems 
development and the emergent area of knowledge 
management pay scant attention to the ontological ground 
of knowledge. Consider the assertion by Checkland and 
Holwell  (1998: p. 39) that “the core concern of the IS 
field [is] the orderly provision of data and information 
within an organisational using IT”—clearly this involves 
the development of IS and their use. So what of the 
posited role for IT in the management of knowledge? Can 
phronesis and techne be embedded in IT? And can such 
systems account for all contingencies in their application? 
As Orr (1990) illustrated in his study of photocopier 
repair technicians, the attempted codification of a fairly 
well defined ‘techne’ proved a failure; here phronesis 
proved the more influential of the two types of individual 
knowledge. Why? Because of the contextual nature of the 
Heideggerian ‘breakdowns’ encountered and the 
experiential knowledge of the repairmen, some of which 
was vicariously acquired through the Brunerian narratives 
they engaged in while constructing their ‘community of 
knowing’. How then can IT capture adequately the 
experiential and interpretive nature of the phronesis 
required for this type of problem solving? As Dreyfus 
(1998) concludes, the answer to this question is it cannot. 
Consider also the IT-enabled ‘techne’ of processing a 
business transaction. Here, the experiential knowledge of 
the operator plays a major role in dictating the questions 
posed and details taken in efficiently executing a 
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 transaction, irrespective of the routinized features and 
activities embedded in the system. Why? Because 
information systems are ‘closed’ in the sense that they 
cannot ever capture all aspects of a business problem 
domain. In different spheres of organizational activity, the 
data required to resolve a ‘breakdown’ might be of a more 
comprehensive nature (e.g. a report or narrative aimed at 
informing task-based problem solving), while targeting a 
problem solving ‘techne’. In this scenario the context-
dependent experiential knowledge of both the author and 
the recipient(s) will be of especial import and will depend 
on the actors’ unarticulated, shared social background. If, 
for example, the author and recipient belong to a 
particular socially constructed ‘community of practice’ 
(Brown and Duguid, 1991), then each will participate in a 
shared tradition with similar phronetic and technic 
backgrounds. However, even with this shared 
background, Boland and Tenkasi (1995) indicate that the 
support available from conventional systems will be 
limited to well-defined user needs. Given all that has been 
said here it is doubtful that the futuristic ‘electronic 
communication forums’ suggested by Boland and Tenkasi 
will be anymore successful than their data processing 
predecessors in supporting knowledge transfer and 
management within ‘communities of knowing’, despite 
shared phronetic and technic backgrounds.  
 Echoing Dunne (1993), practical knowledge 
(phronesis and techne) is a fruit that can grow on the 
fertile soil of individual experience; however, experience 
of the world occurs within a web of social relationships, 
and individual knowledge develops within the historical 
context of a tradition under the influence of significant 
others. But does all this imply for the IS field? Consider, 
for example, that extant perspectives on IT competencies 
chiefly operate from resource-based view of the firm, 
which is positivist in its orientation and focuses on the 
outcomes of the application of capabilities rather than the 
process by which they come into being. Resultant theories 
are not therefore sensitive to the type of ontological issues 
described herein and, accordingly, fail to capture the 
social and historical nature of individual knowledge in 
institutional contexts. On this point, future studies on the 
development and application of IT competencies should, 
we believe, take an interpretive stance and focus on how 
phronesis and techne are developed and applied in 
institutional contexts and not just on outcomes.  
Conclusions 
This paper joins calls within the IS field for a 
reassessment of its position on the important topic of 
knowledge. True, the fundamental ideas presented herein 
are not new, but the manner of their presentation and 
argument is. In any event, given the recent feeding frenzy 
on the topic of knowledge and the unquestioning 
acceptance of the nostrums proposed by some of those 
championing the cause, a timely injection of 
commonsense is called for. To recap, this paper’s main 
argument is that knowledge of social phenomena defies 
objectification and representation. Institutional knowledge 
does not therefore exist as an objective phenomenon 
outside of the heads of the knowers: but what of 
information? Having illustrated why knowledge cannot be 
represented, a question is raised as to the status of 
information. Following a constructivist logic, Introna 
(1997) points out that information is ‘hermeneutic 
understanding’ and is acquired through an interpretive 
process by an ‘already-knowing’ individual. Hence, if 
information too is abstract and ambiguous in its depiction, 
data is all that can be represented, stored, transferred and 
manipulated by IT. Again it must be emphasized that the 
primary mode of informing is the narrative: as such 
narratives serve to define the canonical, and help 
construct and maintain institutionalised patterns of 
behaviour; but, narratives, written or oral, consist of data, 
not knowledge or information—hence, the need for 
dialogue and dialectic. Therefore, if IT is to be utilized to 
give voice to organizational narratives, then it must be 
recognized that it will be a conduit for data only. And 
because gaps in comprehension will always exist, no 
matter how sophisticated the technology and its power of 
representation, IT must enable a dialectic to take place 
between social actors and the phenomena they wish to 
understand. These points are reflected in the capabilities 
of the latest generation of Internet/Intranet-enabled 
knowledge management applications (see the 
ServiceWare Inc.2 product suite, for example). Although 
the vendors of such products argue that they are capturing 
the knowledge of customers, employees, and domain 
experts, the inputs to and outputs from such applications 
tend to be well-defined and constitute significant 
abstractions from the phronesis and techne of social 
actors (again in the form of data). Hence, considerable 
interpretation is required, and while knowledge base 
inference engines are limited in this respect, human 
beings are well adapted to this process, even though their 
interpretations of phenomena rarely concur with those of 
other actors, except in situations where the data in 
question is well delimited. That such systems are of 
limited value in helping social actors communicate and 
repair the ‘breakdowns’ they encounter is not at issue; 
they do not, however, help social actors manage 
knowledge in organisation.      
 In conclusion, it is unfortunate that in order to help 
make sense of what is a complex, socially constructed 
world, academics and practitioners have created ‘cartoon’ 
explanations of the realities they perceive—and the 
concept of knowledge is here included, as data has been 
accorded the status of knowledge. There is nothing wrong 
with this, it’s how ordinary people unreflectively make 
sense of their world, but it is not the foundation on which 
a science should rest.  
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1
 This is not a universal rejection of ‘foundational’ 
thought as such. Take, for example, the foundational 
philosophy of Hegel which greatly influenced the work of 
‘anti-foundational’ philosophers such as Heidegger and 
Gadamer, especially in relation to the role of the dialectic 
in understanding (Gadamer, 1976). Also, in the social 
sciences, Karl Mannheim drew on Hegel’s philosophy to 
inform his perspective on the sociology of knowledge. Of 
particular relevance here, however, is that the author of 
this paper has integrated Hegel’s dialectic into his 
hermeneutic method for interpretive research in 
information systems (see Butler, 1998).  
2
  A ServiceWare Inc. white paper on the knowledge 
replication tools this company produces and markets can 
be found at: 
HTTP://www.serviceware.com/pdf/knowledgereplication.
pdf.  
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